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Education Finance Reform Litigation
and Separation of Powers: Kentucky

Makes Its Contribution
INTRODUCTION

"We are ever mindful of the immeasurable worth of education
to our state and its citizens, especially to its young people."'

In 1989, Kentucky joined the ranks of states that have con-2
fronted the constitutionality of their educational finance systems .
These constitutional challenges have involved concerns with educational opportunity being dependent on where children live; since
funding commonly is tied to property values,, and since property

Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Ky. 1989).
See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Parker
v. Mandel, 344 F. Supp. 1068 (D. Md. 1972); Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870
(D. Minn. 1971); Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff'd mem.,
397 U.S. 44 (1970); Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff'd mem. sub
nom., Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969); Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz.
1973) (en banc); DuPree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Serrano
v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907
(1977); Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982) (en banc);
Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga.
1981); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975); Blase v. State, 302 N.E.2d 46
(Ill.
1973); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Hornbeck
v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983); Milliken v. Green, 203 N.W.2d
457 (Mich. 1972), vacated, 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973); Helena Elementary School Dist.
No. 1, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); State ex rel. Woodahl v. Straub, 520 P.2d 776 (Mont.
1974); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973);
Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 453
N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982); Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d 432 (N.C. Ct.
App.), appealdismissed mem., 361 S.E.2d 71 (N.C. 1987); Board of Educ. v. Walter, 390
N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979); Fair School Fin. Council, Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla.
1987); Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139 (Or. 1976); Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979);
Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1988); Edgewood Indep. School Dist.
v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Seattle School Dist. No. I v. State, 585 P.2d 71
(Wash. 1978) (en banc); Northshore School Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 530 P.2d 178 (Wash.
1974) (en banc), rev'd, 585 P.2d 391 (Wash. 1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W.
Va. 1979); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989); Washakie County School Dist.
No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 80

values fluctuate greatly based on location, unequal per pupil ex3
penditures often result.
During the past twenty years, constitutional challenges to school

4
funding methods have been mounted in almost half of the states.

The importance of state decisions on education questions is amplified by San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,5
where the United States Supreme Court held that education is not

a fundamental right under the United States Constitution. 6 The
Court's decision pushed school reform into the state courts for

litigants concerned that school funding disparity causes unequal
7
educational opportunities.
School reform litigation, which has been divided into three
distinct waves by commentators, 8 has offered a wide range of
arguments, with varying degrees of success. 9 These cases have
proceeded along three lines: the Rodriguez "rational basis" test as
adopted by state courts; 10 education as a fundamental right subject

to state equal protection guarantees; 1" and education as a fundamental right based on state education clauses, where grossly unequal per pupil expenditures result in a facially unconstitutional

I

As one commentator noted, although local school districts, with the exception of
Hawaii, receive both state and federal aid, much of the money comes from tax rates that
are locally set based on the value of real property in the districts. This situation results in
unequal per pupil funding. See Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana,
Kentucky, and Texas Decisions on the Future of Public School FinanceReform Litigation,
19 J. L. & EDUC. 219, 219 n.2 (Spring 1990).
Maximum rates may be set by state statute, foreclosing residents from providing higher
tax funds. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 160.475 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982) [hereinafter KRS]. Funding differences among local school districts in Kentucky showed great
disparity. "The assessed valuation of property per pupil ... ranged from $244,305.32 for
Beechwood Independent... to only $29,806.67 for McCreary County." Brief for Appellees
at 6, Rose v. Council For Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989)(No. 88-SC-804TG).
Three distinct methods have been tried in attempts to remedy funding disparities: flat
rate grant foundation programs, power equalization plans, and need based foundation
programs. See Thro, supra, at 219 n.3.
4 See Note, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional Provisions
in Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. Rav. 1639, 1640 (1989).
5 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
6 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35.
See Thro, supra note 3, at 219-26; Note, Litigating State ConstitutionalRights to
an Adequate Education and the Remedy of State Operated Schools, 42 RUTGERS L.J. 779,
780 (1989-90).
8 Thro, supra note 3, at 219, 222.
9 Id.
10 See infra notes 48-112 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 113-68 and accompanying text.
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system. 12 Much of the individual states' inconsistent treatment of
the school funding issue may be traced to the different state constitutional clauses 3 and the diverse methods of school financing
4

considered. '

While attaining the goal of an equal education is a noble
pursuit, it may be argued that this goal is best served through the
political process, which recognizes the traditional concern of "local
control" in the education context.15 Nevertheless, when a state
legislature shirks its duty to provide an equal education, the courts
6
must exercise the judicial power of constitutional interpretation.'
However, by engaging in judicial activism in traditional fields of
legislative domain, such as education, state judiciaries leave themselves open to attack via principles of separation of powers including the related political question doctrine.
This Note examines the history of school funding decisions
relating to the separation of powers doctrine. Part I provides a
brief background on the separation of powers doctrine and its
relationship to the political question doctrine.17 In Part II, this
Note examines Rodriguez, and state decisions following its analysis.18 Part III discusses those state cases rejecting the Rodriguez
rationale. 9 Part IV explores recent state education cases. 20 Finally,
this Note concludes that Kentucky's contribution, Rose v. Council
for Better Education, Inc.,21 reflects the proper balance between
22
separation of powers concerns and educational equality.
,1See infra notes 169-220 and accompanying text.
,1See Note, supra note 4, at 1661-72.
" See generally supra note 3.
,1The idea of local control has long been used as a justification for different school
funding programs; this argument was persuasive in Rodriguez. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 5053; see also Note, supra note 7 (recognizing that there is room for debate as to who can
best govern the schools-local districts, the legislature, or the courts).
16As one commentator has noted, the separation of powers doctrine in the federal
system should not preclude courts from "refashion[ing]" schools, prisons, and other such
administrative concerns, following the Supreme Court decisions in Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Horowitz,
Decreeing OrganizationalChange: JudicialSupervision of Public Institutions, in TBE CouRTs:
SSPARATION OF PowERs 49 (Annual Chief Justice Earl Warren Conference, 1983) (Sponsored
by Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers Foundation). It is still an open question as to
whether the loosening of doctrinal positions on separation of powers, standing, the political
question doctrine, etc., has done more harm than good. See id. at 49-68.
17 See infra notes 23-47 and accompanying text.
'8See infra notes 48-112 and accompanying text.
,1See infra notes 113-68 and accompanying text.
10See infra notes 169-220 and accompanying text.
21

790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).

2

See infra notes 221-28 and accompanying text.
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THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND POLITICAL QUESTION
DOCTRINES

The framers of the constitution, influenced by political theorists
of the Age of Reason,2 3 formulated the doctrine of separation of
powers in American jurisprudence. Separation of powers refers to
both the division of government into three branches and the principle of "checks and balances."24 In practice, separation of powers
analysis focuses on the differences in government functions among
the three branches, resulting in the need to keep the branches
separate. 2 Resolution of separation of powers questions leads to a
"functional" approach or, according to Holmes and Cardozo, a
"judgment by labels." '26 At first glance, separation of powers analysis is deceptively simple. In evaluating education policy, the conclusion may be reached that this function is better left to the more
politically responsive legislature than the judiciary. This "judgment
by labels" ignores the fact that implementation of a government
program, like education, does not fit neatly under any one division
of government. 2 As one commentator has noted, in discussing the
problems of functional separation of powers analysis:
The inefficacy of resorting to a general notion of separation of
powers to resolve contests between ... branches of government
has long been demonstrated by our history .... [T]o resort to

the idea that there is a tripartite division of powers, legislative,
executive, and judicial, each term self-defining, is to deal with
phantasms. If we take the basic arguments usually asserted that
it is for the legislature to make the rules governing conduct, for
the executive to enforce those rules, and for the judiciary to apply
those rules in the resolution of justiciable contests, it soon becomes apparent that it is necessary to government that sometimes
the executive and sometimes the judiciary has to create rules, that

21

See Kurland, The Rise and Fall of the "Doctrine" of Separation of Powers, 85

MICH. L. REV. 592, 592 (1986).
24 Id. at 593.

1 See Strauss, Formaland FunctionalApproaches to the Separation-of-PowersQuestions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 492-93 (1987). Professor Strauss
distinguishes between "functional" and "formal" approaches to separation of powers
questions. Under a "formal" analysis, the functions of the three branches of government
are thought incapable of being joined in a "shared" government powers system. A "functional" approach attempts to classify government action as legislative, executive, or judicial.

Id.
, See Kurland, supra note 23, at 593.
27 Id. at 603.
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sometimes the legislature and sometimes the judiciary has to
enforce rules, and sometimes the legislature and sometimes the
executive has to resolve controversies over the rules. And these
variations became more imperative as government became more
invasive and complex.
The purpose of the doctrine was to protect individual liberty
from a centralized government. 29 However, the doctrine's importance has faded as protection of individual liberty has come, in
large part, from limitations imposed by the Bill of Rights.3 0 As a
theoretical underpinning of our republican form of government,
reasons for adherence to the separation of powers doctrine in the
modern era derive from "the rule of law," which "is the last best
'
hope for avoiding the arbitrary tyranny of government."' 3
While separation of powers remains a deeply rooted ideal federally, as the Supreme Court has recognized, "[T]he doctrine of
separation of powers embodied in the Federal Constitution is not
mandatory on the States. "32 Thus, education finance reform litigation that centers on state constitutional law3 3 derives any sepa34
ration of powers constructions from state constitutional provisions.
The Kentucky Supreme Court has held, "[Tihe separation of
powers doctrine is fundamental to Kentucky's tri-partite system of
government and must be 'strictly construed."'' 35 In Legislative Research Commission v. Brown,36 the court rejected a call to construe
the doctrine liberally by distinguishing authority from states that
did not have the "unusually forceful" separation of powers lan37
guage of the Kentucky Constitution.
The court's meaning of "strict" construction is readily apparent from the Brown decision. In Brown, the court examined sta-

Id.
21Id. at 611.
28

30

Id.

'z

Id. at 612.

Whelan v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689 n.4 (1979). Generally, the concept that
federalism prohibits the Court from examining state separation of executive and judicial
powers is found in Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71 (1902). See also Note, Justice Without
Fear: Due Process and Separation of Executive and Judicial Powers inSate Government,
94 YALE L.J. 1675, 1686-92 (1985) (arguing that the Dreyer doctrine does not completely
bar due process review of state executive and judicial powers).
3 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
See generally CAL. CONST. art. III; KY. CONST. §§ 27-28; MD. CONST. art. 8; W.
VA. CoNsr. § 1 (separation of powers provisions).
"

Legislative Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 912 (Ky. 1984).

36 664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984).
"

Id. at 910.
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tutes passed by the General Assembly that empowered the Legislative
Research Commission (LRC) to veto administrative regulations and
declared the LRC, "an independent agency of state government
... which is exempt from control by the executive branch and
'
from reorganization by the Governor." 38
The court considered
legislative and executive functions, strictly applying separation of
powers to hold the LRC statutes unconstitutional. 39 By examining
traditional functions of the legislature, executive, and judiciary,
the court's separation of powers analysis approached a "judgment
by labels." Nevertheless, commentary following Brown praised the
court's method, heralding the case as "Kentucky's Marbury v.
Madison. ',4
A functional approach to separation of powers is distinguished
from those instances when a court declines to examine a constitutional issue by deferring to another branch, because it perceives
the judiciary as less competent to deal with an area of government
activity. This judicial deference, on such matters as education
policy, 4' implicates the political question doctrine, 42 which has a
close relationship to separation of powers. As Justice Brennan
noted in Baker v. Carr,43 "The nonjusticiability of a political
question is primarily a function of the separation of powers.""4
Further:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion. 45

38

KRS

§ 7.090(1).

Brown, 664 S.W.2d at 912.
, Snyder & Ireland, The Separation of Governmental Powers Under the Constitution
of Kentucky: A Legal and HistoricalAnalysis of L.R.C. v. Brown, 73 Ky. L.J. 165, 207
31

(1984-85).
See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50-53 (1973);
Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 790 (Md. 1983); Board of
Educ., Levittown Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 363, 453 N.Y.S.2d
643, 647 (1982); Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360, 366 (Pa. 1979); Kukor v. Grover, 436
4'

N.W.2d 568, 582-83 (Wis. 1989).
42 Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question", 79 Nw. U.L. REv. 1031,
1031-35 (1985).
,' 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
" Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 198 (1962).
Id. at 217.
41
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Without addressing academic concerns over the continued viability
of the political question doctrine, 46 in large measure, Justice Brennan's approach can be phrased: Where in the three branches of
government does the constitutional issue reside? By any other
name, this analysis appears little different from a "functional"
approach to separation of powers. Indeed, when a court declines
to rule on educational guarantees because education policy is traditionally for the legislature, the court's concerns touch both the
separation of powers and political question doctrines. 47 For the
purposes of this Note, separation of powers broadly includes the
functional division of powers among the three branches of government and the system of checks and balances implicated in the
political question doctrine.
II.

HISTORY OF SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM CASES: TE

RODRIGUEZ RATIONAL BASIS TEST AND ITS ADHERENTS

A.

The Rodriguez Decision

In 1973, recognizing that education is "important" based on
Brown v. Board of Education,41 the Supreme Court in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, held that education is
neither an explicit nor an implicit fundamental right under the
United States Constitution. 4 9 Had the Court found education to be
50
a fundamental right, Texas conceded that its funding system,
under attack in the case, could not withstand a "strict scrutiny"

41 Some academicians maintain that the political question doctrine has no viability,
while others differ. Compare Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw,
73 HARv. L. REv. 1, 6-9 (1959)(arguing that courts may abstain only wheh the constitution
permits) with Redish, supra note 42, at 1031-33 (arguing that decisions in some cases can
be explained only by invoking doctrine).
"7 Professor Redish asserts that when a court says it lacks competence to render a
decision best left for the other branches, it is deferring to the professional judgment of the
other branches. See Redish, supra note 42, at 1056.
Redish faults courts for taking this easy out, rather than confronting difficult, sensitive,
constitutional issues. This approach works as an abdication of the courts' proper duty of
constitutional interpretation under the doctrine of judicial review. Id. at 1050-51.
"' The Court in Rodriguez, quoting Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954), stated, "[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments." San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
41 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35.
" Id. at 4. Texas permitted a school district to impose an ad valorem tax on property
within the district in a Local Fund Assignment. Id.
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test under the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause
analysis.-"
The Court approached the specific question of school funding
constitutionality under a "rational basis" test, 52 by balancing a
"legitimate state interest" against the impact of the funding system
on a suspect class of "poor" students. However, the Court did
not find "poor" persons living in low property value districts to
be such a suspect class. 3 The court held that the Texas system of
public finance did not purposely discriminate, but was a product
of experimentation reflecting the beliefs of qualified educators and
4

legislators .5

In dicta, the court expressed great reluctance to invade taxation
and education, areas "reserved for the legislative processes of the
various states," noting specifically, "[We] do no violence to the
values of federalism and separation of powers by staying our
hand. 5 5 Part of the Court's hesitance may be traced to the popularly held belief that education is best left to "home rule," local
control attuned to community values. 56 Moreover, the Court was
unwilling to assume that it could correctly second-guess state legislators and educational experts of the fifty states by judicially
implementing funding reforms designed to improve educational
57
quality.
The Rodriguez decision pushed school reform litigation into
state courts, to depend on state constitutional guarantees of equal
protection or state education clauses.58 The cases proceeding on
state constitutional grounds have had mixed results, with claims
based on either a combination of equal protection and education
clauses or solely upon education clauses. 59 As one commentator
indicates, the success of these challenges, in large part, has de-

Id. at 16.
A rational basis test questions whether a challenged state action bears a rational
relationship to furtherance of a legitimate state interest. See, e.g., McGinnis v. Royster,
410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973).
53 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 21-22. A strict scrutiny test examines whether there is a
compelling state interest behind a challenged state action. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967).
'"Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 55.
5 Id. at 58.
56 Id. at 50-53; see Note, supra note 7, at 799-800.
'7 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 42.
" Thro, supra note 3, at 225.
5 Id. at 222. For an excellent discussion of state education and equal protection
clauses and their interplay in the field of school finance reform litigation, see also Note,
supra note 4.
'1
"
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pended on the specific wording of the relevant education clauses. 60
Whether a state court finds education to be a fundamental right
correlates with the type of education clause at issue.6 ' In that
respect, some states have followed the Rodriguez equal protection
analysis in the state equal protection context.6 2 Significantly, those
state decisions recognized the Supreme Court's deference to state
legislatures in formulating education policy and found separation
6
of powers objections to a state constitutional right to education. 1
B.

State Decisions Applying Rodriguez

In Danson v. Casey,64 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of a complaint alleging that the state's education funding system violated a state constitutional mandate that
the General Assembly "provide for the maintenance and support
of a thorough and efficient system of public education." 65 Notably,
the "thorough and efficient" education clause involved is the same
type of clause that has brought the most favorable results to reform
litigants. 66 In Danson, where the complainants failed to allege legal
harm to a class of school children, the court found no cause of
action stated, and declined to find education a fundamental right
under this clause.6 7 Likewise, the court followed the Rodriguez
analysis by questioning whether the school funding legislation bore
a reasonable relation to the constitutional purposes of a "thorough
and efficient" education, and not "the reason, wisdom, or expe'68
diency of the legislative policy with regard to education.
Recognizing that the legislature was in a better position to deal
with education policy, the court refrained from action, in part,
because of separation of powers. 69 In sum, the court declined to
define a "thorough and efficient" education where any rule the
court promulgated concerning education funding "would be the
rigid rule that each pupil must receive the same dollar expendi-

Note, supra note 4, at 1661-72.
Id.
62 See infra notes 64-104 and accompanying text.
60
61
63

Id.

61 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979).
' PA. CONST. art. III, § 14.
66 See Note, supra note 4, at 1661.
67 Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d at 360, 367 (Pa. 1979).
- Id. at 366 (quoting Teachers' Tenure Act Cases, 197 A. 344, 352 (Pa. 1938)).
Id. at 367.
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tures. ' ' 70 From a judicial management viewpoint, the court felt that

such a rule would inadequately serve the needs of different school
districts, and more importantly, the future needs of school chil7
dren. '

Unlike the plaintiffs in Danson, who relied on a "thorough
and efficient" education clause, 72 the plaintiffs in Board of Education, Levittown Union Free School District v. Nyquist,

3

relied

on federal and state equal protection guarantees, as well as a state
education clause imposing a duty of maintaining "free common
schools," in seeking a declaratory judgment that the school funding
system was unconstitutional. 74 After disposing of the federal claim
under the authority of Rodriguez, the court applied the Rodriguez
"rational basis" test to the state claim.7 5 While the level of education funding in New York exceeded most other states, there
76
remained a wide disparity in per pupil funding between districts.
Nevertheless, the court declined to find a state equal protection
violation noting, like the Rodriguez Court, that education is a high
priority, but not a fundamental right triggering heightened equal
protection analysis. 77 Instead, the court found the less strict "rational basis" test satisfied since the state gave an equal amount of
funds to each district, with the disparity in per pupil spending
coming from different district property tax bases . 7
It has been recognized79 that cases like Nyquist, proceeding
under a "free and common schools" clause, which arguably imposes only a minimum duty on a state legislature, are distinguishable in many respects from those cases that utilize a "thorough
and efficient" education clause. 0 However, the Nyquist court noted
70Id. at 366.
71 Id.
72 See supra note 65.

13 439 N.E.2d 359, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982).
74N.Y. CONST. art. 11, § 1. This category of education clauses has produced the least
favorable results for school finance reform plaintiffs because of a "minimum education
obligation" rationale. Note, supra note 4, at 1661-62.
11 Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359,
368, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 652 (1982).
76Id. at 368-69, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 652-53. Even today, New York's per pupil spending
varies greatly-from $26,230 to $3,091. Hearing on H.R. 3850, The Fair Chance Act,
Before the Subcomm. on Elementary, Secondary, and Vocational Educ. of the House
Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1990).
Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 366, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 650-51.
71 Id. at 367-68, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 651-52.
See generally Note, supra note 4 (grouping education clauses into four categories,
depending on the legislature's educational obligation).
10 Id. at 1661-62.
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that education is a concern of both the legislative and executive
branches . 1 Education involves taxation, a traditional legislative
function, and the dual executive/legislative roles of distributing
available state funds across all state programs.8 2 Further, the court
expressed the longstanding belief of the American people that a
public school education should reflect "local control.' '83 The mere
existence of wide disparity in per pupil expenditures did not override these concerns.
Similarly, the Maryland Court of Appeals, in Hornbeck v.
Somerset County Board of Education,8 4 found no fundamental
right to education under a "thorough and efficient" education
clause, and thus employed a rational basis test in a school funding
challenge.8 5 In a broadly worded lower court decision, education
was found to be a fundamental right and, therefore, equal per
pupil funding was constitutionally required.16 The lower court also
held that a "thorough and efficient" education clause required a
"system . . . full and complete by contemporary standards
87
throughout the state."
By extensively examining the history of the framers' intent
relating to changes in Maryland's education clause, 8 the Hornbeck
court concluded that the clause did not demand a "uniform"
system, but rather that the legislature had a duty to provide "all
school districts . .. a basic public school education. ' 8 9 Rejecting
decisions from other "thorough and efficient" education clause
states which held per pupil funding disparities constitutionally impermissible, 9° the court followed Rodriguez and held that education
is not a fundamental right under the Maryland constitution, citing

" Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 363, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 648.
'2 Id.
" Id. at 367-68, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 651-52; see also supra note 14.
458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983).
, Horbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 782 (Md. 1983). That
constitution provides: "The General Assembly ... shall by Law establish throughout the
State a thorough and efficient System of Free Public Schools; and shall provide by taxation,
or otherwise, for their maintenance." MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
Hornbeck, 458 A.2d at 769.
, Id. at 767-68.
' while the 1864 Maryland Constitution called for simply a "uniform" system of
schools, it was subsequently amended in 1867. Specifically, some delegates thought the
phrase "efficient" required an "economical system." Additionally, the delegates expressed
concern that future details of the system "should be left to the Legislature . . . " Id. at
772-73.
0 Id. at 776.
91Id. at 777-79.
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Danson and Nyquist as support for its decision. 9' In that regard,
the different wording of the respective educational clauses, "thorough and efficient" versus "free common schools," was not significant to the Maryland court's holding that education was no
more fundamental than other government services such as a right
to police or fire protection.9 2 Under the rational basis test, the
court decided that the values of "local control" were satisfactory.93
Notably, the Hornbeck court expressed concern over its inability to deal effectively with the perceived deficiencies of the public
system. 94 While the court recognized the "central role of education
in ... society," it nonetheless admitted,
[l]t is not within the power or province of members of the
Judiciary to advance their own personal wishes or to implement
their own personal notions of fairness under the guise of constitutional interpretation. The quantity and quality of educational
opportunities to be made available to the State's public school
children is a determination committed to the legislature or to the
people of Maryland through adoption of an appropriate amend95
ment to the State Constitution.
96
In 1989, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Kukor v. Grover,
became the most recent adherent of the Rodriguez rational basis
test. Construing the Wisconsin education clause calling for education "as nearly uniform as practical, ' 97 the court upheld dismissal
of a complaint alleging that unequal per pupil spending caused by
different local tax bases was constitutionally infirm.98 The court
found that the framers of the state constitution intended to provide
for a method of distribution of school funds; the "uniform"
provision was simply "to assure that the 'character' of instruction
was as uniform as practicable."99 This duty was met by minimum
statutory standards of teacher education, a minimum number of
school days, and a standard school curriculum.' °°

9, Id. at 778-79.
9 Id. at 785.

93Id. at 788.
14Id. at 790.
95Id.
" 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989).
" WIs. CONST. art. X, § 3.
11Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989).
9 Id. at 577.
'11 Id. at 577-78.
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Moreover, the court rejected an equal protection argument
under the Wisconsin constitution by applying a modified Rodriguez
rational basis test.101 The court recognized that "equal opportunity
for education" is a fundamental right under Wisconsin's equal
protection clause; however, where there was no complete denial of
education, the proper standard to be applied was the rational basis
test.10 The dichotomy between state and local control that existed
since the adoption of the constitution warranted application of this
lower test for spending disparities.103 Additionally, the court declined to become a "super-legislature," deferring instead to the
legislative judgment in education, given the strong "political perceptions and emotionally laden views" over the issue of equality
in education.' 4
C. The Place of the Danson-Nyquist-Hornbeck-KukorLine in
School Finance Reform
The Maryland court, in Hornbeck, declined to follow the example of other states that had construed "thorough and efficient"
education clauses to impart a fundamental right to education; 05
similarly, other courts have declined to follow Hornbeck. °6 Nevertheless, the Danson-Nyquist-Hornbeck-Kukor case line's adoption of the Rodriguez rational basis test provides an avenue for
states to follow when faced with school finance reform litigation
that seeks to cast education as a fundamental right, and is arguably
not dependent on a particular education clause. While state courts
naturally may decline to follow nonbinding Supreme Court rationale construing the federal Constitution,10 7 the Rodriguez analysis
remains alive in school finance litigation.

101Id. at 579.
10, Id. at 579-80.
103Id. at 580-81.
Id. at 582-83.
"I, See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Rose v.
Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Helena Elementary School Dist.
No. I v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex.
1989); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
'6 See infra notes 113-68 and accompanying text.
'10 Commentators generally have noted the once expansive role state courts took in
constitutional jurisprudence. However, to a certain extent, that role diminished as the states
"tended to have a 'sorry' record in protecting individual rights." See Note, supra note 4,
at 1657-58.
Nevertheless, some commentators believe that trend to be reversing, with states once
10
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Undoubtedly, strict adherence to a "bright line" between leg-

islative and judicial functions in this field avoids criticism under
the separation of powers doctrine. 0 8 The courts should not impose

their own theories of education policy. However, if state courts
are to regain their prominent role of advancing individual rights,
as some commentators maintain, '1 9 their decisions should not ignore the basic and necessary role of an adequate education in
today's society. As a function of judicial authority, courts should
readily receive education reform cases, despite protestations of the
violation of separation of powers and the incapacity of the courts
to deal with certain constitutional questions." 0 As one commentator
noted,
While common sense may dictate an appropriate degree of substantive deference, the broad policies behind the concept of judicial review require that the judiciary exercise its function, even

again occupying a protective role regarding individual's rights. Most forcefully, the argument
continues that states are more representative of their citizens' values and as such more
political:
Because of state constitutions' unique nature and greater political accountability to the public will, state courts should not feel compelled to follow
blindly federal precedent when interpreting similar state constitutional provisions. Instead, the courts should strive to develop their own independent modes
of analysis, taking into account such factors as the text of the state constitutional provision and the state's history, in addition to the matter being litigated.
Id. at 1658.
1-' This assumes that courts can readily discern the tri-partite structure in a functional
separation of powers analysis. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
'0
See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
11 Dissenting Justice Liebson would have held the Kentucky education reform case to
be nonjusticiable, with the court precluded by the political question doctrine from undertaking review. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 221.
Generally, the reasons given for a court's determination that a particular issue is
nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine are,
(1) the inability of the judiciary to develop general principles and rules of
construction of a particular constitutional provision; (2) the judiciary's lack
of institutional capacity to review particular judgments of one or both of the
political branches; and (3) the judicial humility that flows from the judiciary's
inherently undemocratic nature ... [and] the fear that the judiciary's authority
and legitimacy will be undermined by a blatant disregard of its decision by
the political branches.
Redish, supra note 42, at 1043-44.
Professor Redish rejects such judicially protective rationales given for the political
question doctrine as "unduly narrow, short-sighted and even solipsistic view[s] of the
judiciary's function in a constitutional system." Id. at 1049. Instead, he asserts that as an
exercise of the ultimate judicial function, judicial review, courts should confront the "difficult" cases involving constitutional issues. Id. at 1050-51.
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if this results in an abandonment of rigid adherence to generalized

principle in favor of partially intuitive judgments on the issue of
necessity."'

Finally, as a part of the broad spectrum of judicial review, it
is argued that the judiciary's function and role in jurisprudence is
to decide "cases having a substantial 'political' component or
presenting difficult fundamental questions . . . focus[ing] on the

democratic nature of American government and law and on the
societal development at issue ... further[ing] societal development
112
with respect to the concerns in dispute."
III.

HISTORY OF SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM: STATE CASES
REJECTING THE RODRIGUEZ ANALYSIS

Prior to San Antonio Independent School Districtv. Rodriguez,
California dealt with challenges to its state school finance system
on federal and state equal protection grounds, as well as under a
' In
"common schools" education clause. 13
4 the
Serrano v. Priest,"1
court evaluated a motion to dismiss petitioner's complaint." 5 Taking the allegations to be true, the court formulated the issue as
whether unequal per pupil funding violated the constitutional mandate of a system of "common schools. 1 1 6 Although finding that
7
the education clause did not require equal spending per pupil,"1
the court held that where a child's education depended on the
affluence of the district in which she lived, a suspect class based
on wealth existed and a "strict scrutiny" test applied." 8 Local
Id. at 1050.
Bowsher v. Synar: Governmental Functions and ConstitutionalDoctrine:
The Historical Constitution, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 553, 588 (1987).
2Osgood,

CAL. CONST. art. IX,

§ 5.

487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). The first Serrano case found a cause of
action averred by class action plaintiffs charging that the state education finance system
violated both federal and state equal protection guarantees. The court remanded the case
to give plaintiffs the opportunity to prove their allegations. The disposition of the case
under the fourteenth amendment was overturned by Rodriguez. However, on remand, the
court affirmed its holding under the California Constitution, article I, sections 11 and 21,
(state equal protection guarantees) that poorly funded districts were a suspect class and
local control formed no legitimate state interest. Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal.
Rptr. 345 (1977) [hereinafter Serrano II].
"I Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1245, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 605 (1971) [hereinafter
Serrano 1].
116 Id. at 1248, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
7 Id. at 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
'"Id. at 1260-63, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620-23.
"
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administrative control of school funds did not provide a compelling
state interest, where "fiscal freewill [was] a cruel illusion for the
poor school districts."" 9 Thus, the court found unequal spending
violative of both the fourteenth amendment's Equal Protection
20
Clause and the state equal protection guarantee.
After remand of Serrano, the California legislature acted to
correct objectionable features of the funding system. 12 ' In the interim, the United States Supreme Court decided Rodriguez, fore1 22
closing fourteenth amendment equal protection remedies.
Nevertheless, the modified funding system failed "strict scrutiny"
under state equal protection analysis in the second Serrano case.'2
The majority concluded that under a "strict scrutiny" test, presumptions of constitutionality afforded to legislative acts disappear.' 24 The dissent argued that separation of powers required the
court to uphold the legislature: "So long as [it] has performed its
work in a manner consistent with overriding constitutional principles, [the court] must uphold its efforts regardless of our personal
125
views as to the fairness or wisdom of those legislative results.'"
While the dissent did not rely solely upon the separation of powers
question, 126 its concerns reflect the lingering doubts of those that
question judicial intrusion into educational matters. 2 7
Illustrating that state constitutional jurisprudence may differ
dramatically from federal constitutional construction, the New Jersey Supreme Court gave its response to school finance litigation,
thirteen days after the Rodriguez decision, in Robinson v. Cahill. 28
The court discussed different constructions applicable to federal
equal protection and its state counterpart, finding that labels such
as "fundamental right," and "compelling state interest," do little
to aid equal protection analysis. 29 However, the particular balancing the court employed, "[A] court must weigh the nature of the

"I Id. at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
120 Id., 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
"2 Serrano II, 557 P.2d at 931-32, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 347-48.
122 Id.
at 949, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
2
124
2
126
27
120

Id.
Id.

at 951-52, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 367-68 (1977).
at 957, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 373.

Id. at 958-59, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 374-75. (Richardson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 959, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50-53 (1973).
Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).

"I Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 282 (N.J.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973)
[hereinafter Robinson 1].
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restraint . . . against the apparent public justification,"' 30 appears
scarcely different from the Rodriguez rational basis test. The court
declined to hold the New Jersey funding scheme unconstitutional
under the state equal protection clause, noting "[T]he equal protection clause may be unmanageable if it is called upon to supply
categorical answers in the vast area of human needs . .. "3'
Finding education to be "vital" rather than "fundamental"
under the New Jersey constitution, 132 the court turned instead to
the state's education clause, which mandates a "thorough and
efficient" system of public schools, to declare the school finance
program unconstitutional. 33 The court concluded that the framers
adopting the education clause had equal educational opportunity
in mind, as opposed to equality among state taxpayers. 34 Because
the court was not offered another means to gauge whether the
state school system met the constitutional mandate of a "thorough
and efficient" system, the court found that discrepancies in per
pupil funding, based on local property values, did not meet constitutional muster. 135 Noting that it could not "unravel the fiscal
skein,' 1 36 the court reserved jurisdiction to hear arguments on
whether it could order distribution of funds appropriated by the
137
legislature without violating the separation of powers doctrine.
Subsequently, the court decided it could direct distribution of funds
38
consistent with separation of powers.
Ironically, the court cited the second Serrano decision for the
proposition that equality measured by the "needs" of pupils would
be judicially unmanageable while equality in dollar amounts would
not. 39 Reviewing the history of the Robinson litigation,' 4° one

130 Id.

Id. at 283.
Id. at 284. Subsequently, the New Jersey court construed the "thorough and
efficient" education clause to afford a fundamental right to education. Robinson v. Cahill,
351 A.2d 713, 720 (N.J. 1975) [hereinafter Robinson 11].
"I Robinson 1, 303 A.2d at 294.
11 Id. at 294.
"

"

Id. at 295.
at 298.

136Id.
1'

Id.

,3, See Robinson II, 351 A.2d 713.
"9 Robinson I, 303 A.2d at 278.
"-To call the Robinson history never ending may not be an overstatement. Robinson
has been before the New Jersey Supreme Court seven times over thirteen years. See Robinson
1, 303 A.2d 273; Robinson v. Cahill, 306 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1973); Robinson v. Cahill, 335
A.2d 6 (N.J. 1975); Robinson II, 351 A.2d 713; Robinson v. Cahill, 355 A.2d 129 (N.J.
1976); Robinson v. Cahill, 358 A.2d 457 (N.J. 1976); Robinson v. Cahill, 360 A.2d 400
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wonders whether the same can be said for the court's attempt to
oversee school funding schemes. In one of its many decisions, 4 '
the court expressed an unwillingness to intrude into the legislative
process. 42 However, the court found that an exigency existed with
no constitutional system of financing and no concomitant administrative processes in place before the coming school year. 143 The
court thus limited its intrusion as a last resort in an effort to
comport with the separation of powers doctrine.'" While the entire
45
question of education policy is arguably best left to legislatures,
the court may have been correct when it stated:
If then, the right of children to a thorough and efficient system
of education is a fundamental right guaranteed by the [New
Jersey] Constitution, . . . it follows that the court must "afford
an appropriate remedy to redress a violation of those rights. To
find otherwise would be to say that our Constitution embodies
rights in a vacuum, existing only on paper."'
As the court indicates, where a legislature fails to meet its
constitutional duty, the judiciary may be wholly justified in invading its domain. However, the saga of the Robinson litigation also
foretells the dangers of judicial intervention into education policy.
Such dangers exist, ranging from a decreased expectancy of the
judiciary as an effective problem solving institution to the concerns_
of the court itself with respect to conservation of judicial resources.
But, avoiding difficult decisions because of general institutional
concerns ignores the court's function and duty to exercise judicial
review. 47 Such abdication would then make the Robinson court
' 48
correct that rights would exist "in a vacuum."'

(N.J. 1976). For a discussion of the Robinson litigation impact, see Tractenberg, Reforming
School Finance Through State Constitutions: Robinson v. Cahill Points the Way, 27
RUTGERS L. REV. 365 (1974); Tractenberg, The Thorough and Efficient Clause, 38 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 312 (1973); Ruvoldt, EducationalFinancing in New Jersey: Robinson v.
Cahill and Beyond, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (1973).
'1' Robinson II, 351 A.2d 713.
141

'4

Id. at
Id.

718.

I" Id. at 723.
,41See Rodriguez, 411 U.S at 50-53. As commentators have noted: "It is an axiom of
American government that the legislature holds the purse strings ... This is traditionally

viewed as the means by which the representatives of the people hold their most powerful
check and balance on the executive branch." Snyder & Ireland, supra note 40, at 225.
" Robinson II, 351 A.2d at 720.
','

See Redish, supra note 42, at 1061.

141

Robinson II, 351 A.2d at 720.
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Recognizing that provisions of a state constitution may require
higher standards of protection than its federal counterpart, the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals ruled its state school
funding scheme unconstitutional in Pauley v. Kelly. 149 The court
declined to follow Rodriguez and criticized the Supreme Court for
its failure to recognize education as a "fundamental right."' 50
Inspired by the Robinson litigation,' the plaintiffs in Pauley successfully argued that West Virginia's "thorough and efficient"
education clause gave a "fundamental right" to education, which
under state equal protection was not overcome by a "compelling
state interest" of local control.5 2 The decision in Pauley broadened
Robinson by defining a "thorough and efficient" education as;
"[one which] develops, as best the state of education expertise
allows, the minds, bodies and social morality of its charges to
prepare them for useful and happy occupations, recreation and
' 53
citizenship, and does so economically.' 1
The court dismissed any possible separation of powers concerns
by maintaining, "[Clourts are not concerned with the wisdom or
policy of the legislation. ''- 4 Rather, the question upon review was
whether the legislation "ha[d] a reasonable relation to the thorough
and efficient mandate.' 1 55 The court would only intrude into traditional legislative functions when legislation "is offensive to judicial notions about what a thorough and efficient education system
' 156
may be.'
While the Robinson court believed in some judicial restraint in
traditional legislative fields, the Pauley court criticized the New
Jersey Supreme Court's restraint in application of equal protection
guarantees. 157 Instead, the Pauley court noted that equal protection
in the education field, "must mean an equality in substantive
educational offerings and results, no matter what the expenditures
are.'' 58

149 255 S.E.2d 859, 864 (W. Va. 1979). For a discussion of differences in state and
federal constitutional interpretations, see supra note 107.
Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 863-64 n.5 (W.Va. 1979).
' For a discussion of that litigation, see supra notes 128-48 and accompanying text.
,,2
Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 864.
WId. at 877.
'1Id. at 870.

155
Id.

Id. at 871.
Id. at 865 n.7.

IS$Id.
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The court's holding in Pauley did not invade a legislative
function. Rather, it merely passed upon the constitutionality of the
education system as determined through the court's responsibility
as constitutional interpreter. Although the court's language could
be read broadly to mean that the judiciary might determine public
school policy routinely, thus violating the province of the executive
and legislative branches, 15 9 questions of education management are
best left to the legislature, following a court's adjudication of a
constitutional guarantee of equal education.
One reason given for a court's reluctance to intrude into political/legislative fields is the inadequacy of standards by which to
guide lower courts. 160 To its discredit, the Pauley court's broad
definition of "thorough and efficient" does not set specific measures by which to gauge the quality of West Virginia education.
However, the "absence of standards" criticism ignores the judiciary's function of judicial review in favor of more limited institutional concerns.1 61
A. The Place of the Serrano-Robinson-PauleyLine in School
Finance Reform
Undoubtedly, Serrano and its progeny breathed life into school
finance reform litigation in the wake of the Rodriguez decision. 16 2
These cases support the argument that state constitutional jurisprudence may take a leading role in placing higher standards on equal
protection. 63 However, as the previous discussion suggests, their
rationales are left open to attack on separation of powers grounds,
thus potentially lessening the appeal of their reasoning. Of course,
constitutional interpretation seldom remains static' 4 and is subject
to differing views by state judiciaries. 65 The lasting impression
from these decisions is that the separation of powers doctrine is a
minimum hurdle to overcome in school funding cases. The Pauley
court crossed the threshold by framing the issue as simply an
" See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
11 See Redish, supra note 42, at 1060. Professor Redish rejects this rationale, maintaining that any constitutional provision can be supplied with workable standards of interpretation. Id. at 1047.
161

Id. at 1050-51.

See generally Thro, supra note 3 (predicting new hope and optimism in school
finance reform cases); Note, supra note 4.
162

"6

1'

See supra note 107.
Id.

165 Id.
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interpretation of "thorough and efficient."'

The New Jersey court

felt compelled to intrude into a traditional legislative function only
after finding an exigency. 67 As the Serrano-Robinson-Pauley line
of cases indicates, separation of powers is hardly fatal to school
finance challenges. The argument to overcome separation of powers
concerns rests on the courts' function of judicial review. Once the
state court finds education to be a fundamental right, it is axiomatic that the court may "decide cases which involve consideration
of deeply ingrained social attitudes or prejudices" 1 68 in spite of

contrary doctrinal arguments.

IV. RECENT SCHOOL FINANCE CASES: EDUCATION

AS A

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

It was against the backdrop of prior school funding litigation
that the Supreme Court of Kentucky, in Rose v. Councilfor Better
Education, Inc., considered "whether the Kentucky General Assembly ha[d] complied with its constitutional mandate to 'provide
'1 69
an efficient system of public schools throughout the state."'
Based on the framers' intent, 70 the court found education a "fundamental right.' ' 7' Additionally, the courf found the goal of an
"efficient" education clause to be a "system hav[ing] the twin
attributes of uniformity and equality.' ' 72 The court, like the trial
judge, could have turned to equal guaranty provisions in the Kentucky constitution to find the school finance system unconstitutional.173 However, for some inexplicable reason, the court declined
to do so. Instead, the court framed the issue as whether Kentucky's
finance system was "efficient.' ' 74 The court noted the overall
Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 887.
167 Robinson II, 351 A.2d at 718.
"6

"I Osgood, supra note 112, at 589.

10 Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Ky. 1989).
110Consider the comments of Delegate Moore, as quoted by the Rose Court:
Common schools make patriots and men who are willing to stand upon a
common land. The boys of the humble mountain home stand equally high
with those from the mansions of the city. There are no distinctions in the
common schools, but all stand upon one level.

Id. at 206 (citation omitted).
M Id. at 203-06.
Id. at 207.

172
"'

See KY. CONST. §§ 2-3.

,7 The court listed a summary of what "efficient" requires:
1) The establishment, maintenance and funding of common schools in Kentucky is the sole responsibility of the General Assembly.
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inadequacy of the schools, as delineated by education experts,
through Kentucky's rankings among benchmark states and the past
failure of the General Assembly to provide for the schools. 75 The
court had little trouble finding the Kentucky funding scheme unconstitutional, where unequal per pupil funding implicated unequal
educational opportunities. 7 6
Throughout its opinion, the Kentucky court addressed the separation of powers issue, maintaining, "We do not instruct the
General Assembly to enact any specific legislation ... [or] to raise
taxes .... We only decide the nature of the constitutional mandate. We only determine the intent of the framers. Carrying out
that intent is the duty of the General Assembly.' ' 7 7 Taking their
cue from Pauley v. Kelly, 7 8 the plaintiffs argued that there is
broad judicial power to determine what is "offensive to judicial
notions about what a thorough and efficient education system
''
79
is.
1
The court declined to follow Pauley's broad approach to
the separation of powers doctrine. Instead, the court, based on
Legislative Research Commission v. Brown, 80 held that the doctrine must be "strictly construed." '' 8' Separation of powers restrictions on the court were satisfied where no "specific legislation" or
tax increase was ordered. 82 However, the court found that the trial

2) Common schools shall be free to all.
3) Common schools shall be available to all Kentucky children.
4) Common schools shall be substantially uniform throughout the state.
5) Common schools shall provide equal education opportunities to all Kentucky
children, regardless of place of residence or economic circumstances.
6) Common schools shall be monitored by the General Assembly to assure
that they are operated with no waste, no duplication, no mismanagement, and
with no political influence.
7) The premise for the existence of common schools is that all children in
Kentucky have a constitutional right to an adequate education.
8) The General Assembly shall provide funding which is sufficient to provide
each child in Kentucky an adequate education.
9) An adequate education is one which has as its goal the development of the
seven capacities recited previously.
Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212-13.
M"Id. at 213.
176Id.

at 211-212.

,,Id.at 212.
,7 See supra notes 149-61 and accompanying text.
'" Brief for Appellees at 55, Rose v. Council For Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186
(Ky. 1989)(No. 88-SC-804-TG).
'- 664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984). For a discussion of the separation of powers analysis
under Brown, see supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
181Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 213.
112
Id. at 214.
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judge's retention of jurisdiction and supervision of the General
Assembly's efforts violated separation of powers under the "strongly
183
written, definitive constitutional scheme."'
Justice Liebson dissented from the majority holding on the
grounds that the court violated both the separation of powers and
political question doctrines. 184 Although the dissenting justiceagreed
that the General Assembly had failed to provide an "efficient"
public school system, Justice Liebson felt that the judgment should
be reversed because the issue was nonjusticiable in that there was
6 as the touchno "actual controversy."'' s5 Citing Baker v. Carr'1
stone of the political question doctrine and its relationship to
separation of powers, Justice Liebson's principal concern was that
the court declared the entire school funding system unconstitutional, rather than any specific statutes.8 7 Justice Liebson wrote:
[I]n asking that we declare the system unconstitutional but not
the statutes, they were presenting us with a "Gordian" knot ...,
thus presenting us with an insolvable, nonjusticiable dilemma.
And, we have responded with what could be expected when you
open Pandora's box, an Opinion which at the same time declares
everything unconstitutional and nothing unconstitutional.8 8
Liebson feared that the judiciary did not have the capacity to
examine the issue because the court would go too far in an area
89
of constitutional law where standards are difficult to formulate.
Thus, Justice Liebson placed the institutional concerns of the court
over its functional role of constitutional interpreter. 90 In that respect, the justice's argument proves too much. As has been noted:
"[The Judiciary] has never been at a loss to decipher workable
standards for the vaguest of constitutional provisions when it so
desires. ' 19'
During the period when Rose was working its way through the
Kentucky courts, Montana was grappling with a constitutional
"I Id. at 214; see also Ky. CONST. §§ 27-28 (specifying separation of powers).
114Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 224, 228-29 (Liebson, J., dissenting).
11 Id. at 223-25 (Liebson, J., dissenting); see also Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859,
897 (W.Va. 1979) (Neely, J., dissenting) (arguing that educational funding is best left to
the legislature where the court is without proper standards to resolve the issue).
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
" Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 223-24 (Liebson, J., dissenting).
I~Id. at 224 (Liebson, J., dissenting).
219 See Redish, supra note 42, at 1050-51.
' See id.
93 Id. at 1060.
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challenge to its 1985-86 school funding program. 192 In Helena Elementary School District No. 1 v. State,193 the court ruled that
Montana's education clause, which provides that "equality of educational opportunity is guaranteed to each person of this state,"
was violated upon a showing of funding disparities./94 Given the
clause's guarantee of equal educational opportunity, the court did
not reach the question of whether funding violated state equal
protection, nor the question of whether education is a "fundamental right. 1 1 95 Highlighting what the court considered to be elements
of qualitatively equal education,' 96 the court recognized that the
legislature "has the power to increase or reduce various parts of
these elements, and in addition to add other elements for [public
school] funding.' 1 97 The court declined, however, to "spell out the
percentages ... required on the part of the State under the [school
funding program] ... [where the] control of such funds is primarily in the Legislature.' 98
Hence, the court in Helena reviewed the legislative funding
statutes under its role as constitutional interpreter, while recognizing the traditional legislative function of controlling the purse. 199
In this regard, the Helena court went no further than the Kentucky
2
court did in Rose. 00
Later in 1989, Texas, in Edgewood Independent School District
v. Kirby, handed down its ruling that state school funding programs were unconstitutional. 20 1 As in Rose, the education clause at
issue required "an efficient system of public free schools.' '202 The
Texas Supreme Court overruled the lower court's holding that the
challenge involved was a "political question not suitable for judicial

"2 Helena Elementary School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 685 (Mont. 1989).
01 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989).
194 Id. at 689.
191
Id. at 691.
196 The court noted:
There are a number of additional factors which are a significant part of the
education of each person in Montana, including but not limited to such
elements as individual teachers, classroom size, support of the parents of
students, and the desire and motivation on the part of the student which
moves him or her to seek earnestly after an education.
Id.
19

Id.

198 Id.

See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 169-91 and accompanying text.
20
777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
2 Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1989).
'9
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review.' '203 As other state judiciaries have done, 204 the Texas court

held, "[T]his is not an area in which the Constitution vests exclusive discretion in the Legislature. ' 20 5 Citing Rose and decisions
from eight other states, 206 the court limited its holding to construction of the constitutional mandate and, like the Kentucky court,
"[did] not . .. instruct the legislature as to the specifics of the

legislation it should enact; nor [did the court] order it to raise
taxes."

20 7

As in the Rose and Helena decisions, the Texas court engaged
in constitutional interpretation, but complied with the separation
of powers doctrine by ruling solely on the constitutional mandate

at issue and not ordering specific legislation.208 Constitutional interpretation will often greatly affect the other branches' functions.
However, to refuse to examine a constitutional issue because of
deference to political/legislative functions, as flexible as those terms
far toward
may be in this field of constitutional law, goes 20too
9
abrogating the traditional duty of judicial review.

A. The Addition of the Rose-Helena-Edgewood Decisions to
School Finance Reform Litigation
By "strictly" adhering to constitutional provisions of separa-

tion of powers, Rose indicates that courts will do more than simply
give lip service to the separation of powers doctrine. Although the

court did not order a tax increase or specific legislation, thus
technically meeting the court's separation of powers analysis, the

breadth of the court's decision left the legislature few options other
than to enact new school legislation and tax increases. 210 The Rose
court held:
"IId. at 394.
See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Rose, 790
S.W.2d 186; Helena Elementary, 769 P.2d 684; Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); Pauley, 255 S.E.2d 859.
Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 394.
Id. at 398. The Texas court cited: DuPree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d
90 (Ark. 1983); Serrano, 487 P.2d 1241; Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977);
Rose, 790 S.W.2d 186; Helena Elementary, 769 P.2d 684; Robinson, 303 A.2d 273; Seattle
School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978); Paule, 255 S.E.2d 859; Washakie
County School Dist. No. I v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824
(1980).
Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 399.
See supra notes 177-83 and accompanying text.
See Redish, supra note 42, at 1050.
210 The trial judge, Ray Corns, strongly intimated that, in his view, the General
2
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Lest there be any doubt, the result of our decision is that Ken-

tucky's entire system of common schools is unconstitutional ....
This decision applies to the statutes creating, implementing and
financing the system and to all regulations, etc., pertaining thereto.

This decision covers the creation of local school districts, school
boards, and the Kentucky Department of Education to the Min-

imum Foundation Program and Power Equalization Program. It
covers school construction and maintenance, teacher certification-the whole gamut of the common school system in Ken21
tucky. '

Arguably, this broad holding does more than project the framers'
intent regarding an "efficient" school system, implying that sepa-

ration of powers is not a restriction on judicial power to define
constitutional terms. Certainly, the doctrine did not prevent the
court from defining constitutional terms in such a manner as to
cause the revamping of an entire legislated educational system.

The future in this field remains unclear. Kentucky has just
21 2
begun to implement some of the changes mandated by Rose.
Nevertheless, Rose presents a new beginning to education finance
reform, which may be particularly extensive given the broad invalidation of an entire public education system. 2 3 The Rose-HelenaEdgewood decisions add additional weight to general theories of
expanded state constitutional jurisprudence. 21 4 These cases, relying
solely upon state education clauses to make their sweeping changes,
signify the potential for a new revolution in school finance litiga25
tion.
The decisions in Rose, Helena, and Edgewood make clear that
the separation of powers doctrine will not necessarily act as an
impediment to education finance reform litigation. Separation of
powers remains a minimal obstacle to overcome, if an obstacle at

Assembly was left with little choice but to raise taxes to properly fund an "efficient" system
of common schools. Council for Better Educ. v. Wilkinson, No. 85-CI-1759, Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment at 13 (Ky. Franklin Cir. Ct. Oct. 14, 1988).
211 Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 215 (emphasis in original).
212 The full impact of the Rose decision has not yet been felt. However, the Kentucky
education reforms have been heralded as a model for other states, with the process receiving
passing grades in meeting its first year goals. Haas, First-Year Goals Attained in Education
Reform, Cincinnati Enquirer, Mar. 3, 1991, § B at 3, col. 1. Colorado's governor recently
heralded Kentucky's lead in education reform. Lexington Herald-Leader, Jan. 5, 1991, § C
at 1, col. 5.
2M3Thro, supra note 3, at 238-40.
214
21

See supra note 107.
Thro, supra note 3, at 250.
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all, where courts rightly exercise their roles in constitutional construction. A court, in its separation of power analysis, will look to
traditional functions of the different branches in making its findings. 2 6 In doing so, the court will perform its function of constitutional interpretation. 217 Classifying a government function as
legislative, executive, or judicial in a separation of powers "judgment by labels" analysis presents some difficulty. 218 Nonetheless,
wholesale deference to another branch's function at the expense of
settling a difficult constitutional question reduces judicial power
and lowers public expectations by expending the court's "moral
capital. "219 As one commentator noted:
Indeed, there are times when it seems that there is nothing between the potential tyranny of the political branches and the
liberty of the people but a vigilant judicial branch. It is to be
hoped if not expected that the judiciary will have the intelligence,
. 0
good will, and judgment not to go the way of all fleshY
CONCLUSION

State constitutional jurisprudence, allowing a constitutional
guarantee of an equal education, may be applauded for this result
in education finance reform litigation. As this Note indicates,
courts are no longer constrained by notions of judicial deference
to the legislative branches for fear of violating separation of powers
and the related political question doctrine. Assuming a court can
undertake "judgment by labels,"'22 strict adherence to traditional
legislative or executive roles precludes a court from judicially defining a qualitatively adequate education. 22 2 As the individual case

histories convey, such judicial intrusions are fraught with the danger of seemingly endless litigation and problems of judicial management. 223 While the proclamation of constitutionally guaranteed
educational equality may herald the coming of a new age, in
practice, it remains an elusive goal.2 2 4 Under the factors promul-

216
21

See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
See Redish, supra note 42, at 1050.

2I Kurland, supra note 23, at 593.

See Redish, supra note 42, at 1053-54.
Kurland, supra note 23, at 611.
22, Id. at 593.
222 See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
- See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
"'
See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
219
21
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gated in Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc. ,25 questions
may again arise as to what an equal education really is.226
While Kukor v. Grover2 7 indicates that the separation of powers doctrine may still cause a court to be reluctant to proclaim
guarantees of educational equality, out of concern over the traditional role of legislatures, the better and more responsive approach
follows from Rose. The Kentucky court fulfilled separation of
powers proscriptions by adhering to a narrowly defined "strict"
functional construction of separation of powers. To its credit, the
court did not fall prey to judicial avoidance of a difficult constitutional decision by citing its own inadequacy to deal effectively
with the issue. Rather than deny plaintiffs the opportunity to
litigate unfair school fund distribution, the courtroom doors remained open. Avoiding the broad language of Pauley v. Kelly,
that found unconstitutional legislation "offensive to judicial notions about what a[n] . . . efficient education system is,' '22 Rose

struck a balance that comports with the separation of powers
doctrine in spirit, if not in actual effect.
Troy Reynolds

See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
Questions of how equal is equal are elusive. If schools in Lexington, a well funded
district, offer French in elementary grades, must Eastern Kentucky schools, which made up
the Council for Better Education, Inc. in Rose, offer similar courses? Such concerns
influenced the Rodriguez Court in declining to rule-on the right to education issue out of
deference to state legislators and education experts. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 53 (1973).
The Rose court addressed this problem by imposing on the General Assembly the
constitutional duty to adequately fund and supervise a system of common schools "substantially uniform throughout the state." Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790
S.W.2d 186, 211 (Ky. 1989). The emphasis was on equal funding, whereby "The children
of the poor and the children of the rich, the children who live in the poor districts and the
children who live in the rich districts must be given the same opportunity and access to an
adequate education." Id.
-1 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989).
Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 871 (W. Va. 1979).
"

